la noción del “deber sagrado de la civilización”. La Organización Internacional del Trabajo superó esa posición paternalista y en sus dos principales expresiones legislativas adoptó sucesivamente el modelo integracionista y el multicultural. En una evolución paralela a partir de los años ‘70, las Naciones Unidas propusieron en junio de 2006 la Declaración de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, subrayando el derecho a la diferencia y denunciando las injusticias históricas. Empero, cuando el texto llegó a la Tercera Comisión de la Asamblea General, predominó la cautela y el Consejo (ECOSOC) decidió aplazar el examen de la Declaración. Esto provocó la transición de un estado de ánimo triunfalista a uno de frustración y justifica el uso del término “una historia incómoda”, el cual refleja las contradicciones internas en el debate e induce a repensar la estrategia en defensa de los derechos indígenas.

Como lo indicara, el tema requiere un comentario más detallado, así como referencia a las situaciones particulares que contiene el libro y que no puedo encarar. Hay quizás una ausencia mayor, la omisión del papel de la religión en la conformación de la identidad indígena y sus aspiraciones. En general, el volumen es una útil y bien presentada adición a la literatura sobre la cuestión indígena, considerablemente desarrollada en las décadas recientes.

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Manuel Pardo was one of the most important statesmen of the nineteenth century in Latin America. His significance for the history of the continent is comparable to that of Benito Juárez in Mexico, Domingo Sarmiento in Argentina and, perhaps, José Manuel Balmaceda in Chile. He was president of Peru from 1872 to 1876, elected after a campaign that somewhat changed Peruvian politics. Pardo founded the Civilista party, which played a tremendous role in the political system and culture of the country at least until 1919. In 1930-1932, the party’s efforts to elect another Civilista president failed miserably during the very dangerous political and economic crisis of the 1930s, which was called a revolutionary crisis by Peruvian sociologist Carmen Rosa Balbi. Pardo was assassinated in November 1878, while serving as a senator of the Republic for Junín, a key and wealthy department (province or state) in the Peruvian central highlands.
If Pardo deserves a biographer, he would be pleased with the political cultural historian Carmen McEvoy, who wrote her M.A. and Ph.D. dissertations on him, as well as other books that include him as a key figure in the political history and culture of the nation (see *Un Proyecto Nacional en el Siglo XIX. Manuel Pardo y su Visión del Perú* [Lima, 1994]; *La Utopía Republicana. Ideales y Realidades en la Formación de la Cultura Política Peruana, 1871-1919* [Lima, 1997]; *Forjando la Nación. Ensayos de Historia Republicana* [Lima, 1999]). McEvoy has also edited books on Peruvian and Latin American politics, political systems, and political culture. Manuel Pardo is definitively her hero; she sees him in many respects as flawless, visionary, intrepid, sharp, and consequent. In this sense, *Homo Politicus* reads for the most part as a hagiography, rather than a critical book of historical analysis.

Methodologically, too, *Homo Politicus* does not follow the traditional conventions of writing history. There are no footnotes or endnotes, and paragraphs and ideas are not supported with references. The book is rather a personal essay on Pardo, Peruvian politics and its dilemmas, complemented with a bibliographical essay at the end, which discusses the work of other scholars. There are six chapters related to the book’s main topics: 1) a somewhat disappointing overview of the economic history of the country, particularly in relation to the guano boom of the 1845-1876 bonanza which, according to the author, created a Peruvian *encrucijada* (cross-road); 2) a presentation of Pardo’s development as a modern politician, compared to the previous Peruvian politicians, military leaders, or *caudillos*; 3) a discussion of the election of 1871-1872 and its implications for the political system and culture of the country and, more importantly, an analysis of the nature and characteristics of this election compared to previous ones. The Sociedad Independencia Electoral (SIE), the early organization of what would become the Civilista party, constituted, according to McEvoy, a breakthrough for developing a clear and national Republican and civilian consciousness of an enlightened bourgeoisie whose absolute leader was Pardo himself; 4) a description of the dramatic events leading to the inauguration of Manuel Pardo’s government, in which the Republic was *violentada* (subjected to violence) with the attempted coup of the Gutiérrez brothers and the insurrection of the civilian and Limenian multitudes, which ended when the bodies of colonels Silvestre and Marceliano Gutiérrez and others were burned in front of the National Palace in Lima’s central square; 5) a discussion of Pardo’s government and his efforts to reform the state, presented as *la República Práctica* (the Practical Republic); 6) Finally, an examination of the government of General Mariano Ignacio Prado, who succeeded Pardo after the 1876 election; the assassination of Pardo while he was serving as a senator from Junín; and the return, according to McEvoy, to
a new Leviathan. She uses the Leviathan metaphor for most of the book to refer to the early Republic when Peru was mostly administered by military *caudillos*.

There are surprises in this new book, for example, the disconnect between economics and politics that appears in her analysis of nineteenth-century Peruvian political society. This is the first time McEvoy addresses economic questions, as compared with her previous work on Pardo’s republican *ideario* (set of ideas). Her discussion of economic developments before and during Pardo’s life does not take into account other economic sectors beyond guano, and does not deal with the full implications of this rather brief and old-fashioned economic analysis (particularly in chapter one). Her main conclusion repeats over and over again the 1940s historical concept of *prosperidad falaz* (fictitious prosperity), created by venerable Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, and Leviathan *guanero*, which implied that the guano exports created a more powerful Peruvian state, although still controlled mostly by the military, or *una cultura de guerra* (a war culture). But, was this really a Leviathan? A careful reading of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* would place the seventeenth-century vice-regal Peruvian state, or perhaps the Bourbon late eighteenth-century on, closer to a true powerful absolutist state rather than the fragile caudillo and post-caudillo governments.

*Homo Politicus* never engages in the 1970s historiographical debates (Jonathan Levin, Heraclio Bonilla, Shane Hunt, etc.) about whether or not the guano export boom contributed to national development. Did the revenues generated by guano accumulate mostly in the financial sector, or in manufacturing, transportation, mining, or agriculture for export and domestic consumption? Did guano revenues create an infrastructure apart from railroads and new and better educational and health facilities? Did it create *obra* (material progress through public works), as it was called in the nineteenth century? What were the multiple social and economic effects of this new formation of capital boom in the country? She seems to argue, following Alfonso Quiroz’s work, that a good part of this new wealth was lost through corruption. But corruption also has economic effects, whether through consumption or investments. Lavish spending styles were the basis for a fashion culture of boutiques, magazines, and other industries that, we know for sure, based on work done on photography and photographic studios *en la Lima de Ricardo Palma*, bloomed in the 1860s and 1870s. And corrupt business entrepreneurs were also economic investors. McEvoy emphasizes that all the *guaneros* as a block were closely linked to the state through financial connections, a key element defining the guano Leviathan political model set first by president Ramón Castilla in the 1840s, and still certainly in place by 1871-1872. All these economic changes that the reader would like to know about took place in those years.
Then, in this historical essay, which reads mostly as a narrative, people such as José Canevaro, Daniel Ruzo, Toribio Sanz, and Álvarez Calderón, appear to be part of a “transnational plutocracy,” based rather in Paris than in Lima (127-30), whereas Pardo’s group and the members of the SIE were au contraire the leading modernizing bourgeoisie, austere and ethical (moralizadora, moralista), who gave place to a new, watershed political model republicano-burgués (bourgeois-republican). However, Pardo himself benefitted from the guano business. He and his brother-in-law José Antonio de Lavalle, as McEvoy shows (105-106), also invested in guano exports to the United States, some 20,000 pesos, a fortune for the average Peruvian worker at the time who earned, according to Shane Hunt’s research based on the 1876 census, 87 soles (pesos) per year. And don Manuel Pardo later on married the daughter of one of these guano oligarchs based in Paris, Felipe Barreda y Aguilar. Likewise, Manuel Pardo and José Antonio de Lavalle had been owners of the hacienda villa, a large landed estate located close to Lima, which for most of its history was an agricultural slave plantation and the source of their initial capital investment before their guano business. Thus, did not these inter-bourgeois conflicts suggest rather that Pardo, the SIE, and later the Civilista party, were the modernizing bourgeoisie and the others, transnational oligarchic plutocrats? Finally, the political career of Pardo started as Minister of Finances (Secretario de Hacienda) of President-dictator, colonel Mariano Ignacio Prado, the same individual who was his rival and later succeeded him in the National Palace in 1876. Is it possible, then, that a large landowner, a slave-plantation owner, guano exporter, and family-linked with the other class of guaneros, was really the pristine symbol of bourgeois republicanism and civic moral virtues, whereas other political leaders, whether national, regional, or local, were not?

To end, according to the 1876 census, Peru was a nation of 2.7 million inhabitants: two-thirds indigenous peasants, either Quechua, Aymara, or other, and 86 per cent of the total population living in the countryside. Was the Lima-centered modernizing project of Pardo and the SIE during the election of 1872 capable of completely changing the structure and nature of the nation? Or was it just a wishful attempt? Even more wishful, if it came from a Limenian bourgeois “aristocrat” who, before becoming a full-time politician, was a sugar hacienda-owner on the outskirts of the Republic’s capital?

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