of the Latin American state, and the difficulties in forging a nation and a notion of common citizenship. By the same token, the most controversial and problematic sections refer to the implications of his sociological analysis for international relations, leading into a paradox, if not self-contradiction. As I pointed out in my own examination of the puzzle of the South American peace (in Zones of Peace in the Third World), this “long peace” started after 1883, coinciding with the relative consolidation of the Latin American states after 60-70 years of anarchy and disarray. Here is the oxymoron of Centeno’s argument: if wars in Latin America until the late 1880s were ineffectual or irrelevant because states were weak or inexisten, we should expect that after states grew stronger, they should have started fighting more “European-types” of war, not less, or even none. Thus, either his explanation is wrong, or the empirical depiction of the 19th century as relatively peaceful is skewed. As David Mares argues in Violent Peace, “the wars of the first 60-80 years of independence had tremendous consequences: states were created, confederations of states ceased to exist, and the position of states in the regional hierarchy was dramatically altered” (35). Although Mares does not recognize my own depiction of South America as a “zone of peace” after 1883, he concurs that states did consolidate after the 1880s. Hence, we should account for alternative explanations for the variance in the extent of international peace in the region before and after 1883, including the emergence and evolution of a diplomatic political culture in favor of peaceful norms.

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Just a few short years ago, those in search of a good history of Brazil in English had very few choices, and the principal option was the late E. Bradford Burns’ A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 3rd ed.). How dramatically this has changed. As Burns’ text becomes more dated, instructors and the general public now have a growing list of alternatives. In just five years, five new histories have appeared: Thomas Skidmore’s Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (1999), the late Robert Levine’s A History of Brazil (1999), Boris Fausto’s A Concise History of Brazil (1999), and Joseph Smith’s
A History of Brazil (2002). To this sudden spurt of texts we can now add Colin MacLachlan’s A History of Modern Brazil.

Although he wrote a dissertation on colonial Mexico, as a graduate student at UCLA in the sixties, MacLachlan came under Burns’ mentorship. (For the sake of disclosure, I should note that I was a student of Burns at UCLA in the late seventies and early eighties.) A longtime professor of history at Tulane University, MacLachlan is primarily a scholar of Mexico, but he has published on Brazil as well. He is one of those rare scholars who knows both Spanish and Portuguese America well. MacLachlan is not a newcomer to works of synthesis. With William Beezley he has co-written El Gran Pueblo: A History of Greater Mexico (3rd ed., 2004) and with Jaime Rodríguez he co-wrote The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico (1980). His Spain’s Empire in the New World (1988) is another sweeping overview that synthesizes a vast amount of literature on ideas and social change. Clearly, MacLachlan is not afraid to take on large topics.

A History of Modern Brazil is clearly aimed at the classroom. In less than 250 pages, MacLachlan moves through two centuries of Brazilian history in eight chapters. Interspersed through the text are five vignettes to illustrate key points (on Pedro II, Copacabana Beach, Alberto Santos-Dumont, the rain forest, and Toyota) and some helpful photographs. A useful chronology and glossary are at the beginning of the book, and a selected bibliography at the end. MacLachlan jumps right into the story with the declaration of independence in 1822. Just a few brief pages provide background on the colonial period. (In comparison, the Smith and the Skidmore volumes at least have a chapter on the colonial background.) A single chapter covers imperial Brazil, two then survey the rise and demise of the First or Old Republic. Nearly two-thirds of the book is on the period since 1930. Chapter Four covers Getúlio Vargas and his legacy, Chapter Five looks at military rule, and Chapter Six is devoted to the return of civilian politics. Chapter Seven focuses on “Brazil in the New Century,” and the final chapter provides a sort of synthetic reflection on the material covered in the first seven chapters.

Much like Burns, MacLachlan strives to move beyond the usual political and economic narratives that so often characterize textbook histories. Music, dance, soccer, radio, television, gender, race, and many other topics add to the standard political narrative. He does a fine job bringing popular culture into the story. Unlike Burns, literature is virtually absent from this survey, and the bibliography—no Machado de Assis nor Jorge Amado here. MacLachlan writes in a clear and fluid style, but sometimes mentions topics or issues before he has adequately introduced them to the reader (e.g., positivism or the 1937 coup). Some students may be puzzled at times by the flow of events and the
connections with key issues (e.g. slavery and the Paraguayan War). At times, the coverage is too concise. The book could also have been more closely proofread. Overall, however, this is another welcome addition to the growing list of histories of Brazil.

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The army exerted an enduring influence in Brazilian politics from the second half of the 19th century to the early 1980s. The range and scope of military intervention has been the subject of extensive academic debates, most of which aimed at explaining the military coup of 1964 and the 21 years of “bureaucratic authoritarian” dictatorship that followed it. The roots of military intervention have been sought in many aspects of the institution’s life, in class alliances and its relationship with civilian allies.

The internal and informal arrangements that determined to a large degree the officers’ behavior have not been a central issue for historians of the military institution, and the book in question tries to fill this lacuna. Shawn C. Smallman’s *Fear & Memory* relies on new manuscript sources and personal interviews to emphasize the role played by the informal structures that shaped both the army’s political behavior and the institutional version of its history. The author defines these structures as “the unwritten rules, organizations, and beliefs that shape power without official sanction or government funding” (5).

The book analyses the genesis and consolidation of the informal structures in the period from 1889 to 1954. Springing from a secondary position during most of the monarchical period, the army was able to overthrow the regime and proclaim a Republic in the name of order and progress. In spite of its proactive role in the 1889 coup, for decades the army lacked a clear program to unify the different factions around some basic demands, making the struggle for hierarchical control over privates, non-commissioned and rebel officers much more violent and personal than it is normally assumed. In fact, the lack of a clear military ideology, external influences, personal strife, and political divisions constantly undermined formal procedures, making the army vulnerable to instability. In response to this vulnerability, those at the top