The author’s methodological versatility, combined with his precise and accessible prose, provide for a pleasant reading experience. Although one might wish for a more comprehensive discussion of, and self-positioning within, existing scholarship, especially by Brazilian specialists such as Eurípides Funes or Rosa Acevedo Marin, *The People of the River* makes substantial contributions to several fields: It convincingly shows how environmental history facilitates a fresh look at identity, kinship, and power. It makes a strong argument for bringing race back into rural history. Moreover, it intervenes in the field of memory studies by taking landscapes and the ways in which groups and individuals remember nature-society interactions seriously.

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While the coup that toppled the government of João Goulart in 1964 has been studied by a variety of scholars, few studies stand out as much as Maud Chirio’s stimulating book on the event and the military regime that followed it for 21 years. Her book is a worthy successor to the analyses of Alfred Stepan and Ronald Schneider. Indeed, she has gone well beyond their work by taking the reader on a journey inside the Brazilian armed forces. While most analyses look into the barracks from the street, Chirio conducts hers from the inside. The coup and subsequent regime politicized the military to a degree far beyond previous Brazilian experiences and severely affected Brazilian society.

The book grew out of Chirio’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Paris and first appeared as *A política nos quartéis: Revoltas e protestos de oficiais na ditadura militar brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012). This book is not a translation of the Brazilian edition. It is not clear whether the two translators involved worked from the French-language original, the Brazilian edition, or both. The text has been revised and a bit reorganized, perhaps seeking to make it clearer for readers of English, who might be less familiar with Brazil. Unfortunately some of the most interesting and helpful source notes that appear in the Brazilian edition are not included in this one.

What is truly curious about 1964 and the military regime is the lack of clarity about why it happened. Was there really an active threat of a communist conspiracy? The Russian, Chinese, Cuban, even Brazilian Communists were potentially dangerous, but were they mounting a real threat to Brazil? If so, where is the evidence? Did the military and its civilian allies suffer from overactive
imaginations? Or were the Brazilians still dealing with the specter of the 1935 Russian-funded military revolts and their own accumulated dislike for Getúlio Vargas and the increasingly loud labor movement? The agitation in the countryside of the country’s northeast was frightening, but hardly revolutionary. Or were the conspirators yielding to the influence of the United States, which cast Brazil between 1961-64 as a Cold War scenario? French ideas coming out of the colonial war in Algeria had an effect on Brazilian thinking about how to suppress insurgency and eliminate subversion. The emotional anxiety that gripped the military and conservative elites superseded all doubt before it.

The Brazilian military is constitutionally a defensive force and had some difficulty finding doctrinal models for itself. The United States, with its externally-oriented military, was not of much use in that endeavor, despite the myths of intervention accepted by Brazilian civilians. True, the Americans trained Brazilian army and state military police at Fort Gordon, Georgia, prior to the coup, but the type of American training associated with the military regime—intelligence, counter information, and “psychological operations”—for Brazilians at the “infamous” School of the Americas in Panama did not begin until 1966! Chirio noted that “the theory of revolutionary warfare in Brazil can be traced back to the autumn of 1957” when articles from French military journals first appeared in translation in Brazilian military publications (27).

The book is organized in six chapters that address: (1) the pre-coup conspiracies between 1961-64 (the propaganda campaigns, the role of revolutionary war theory in military education, the formation of groups within the officer corps, and the coup itself); (2) continuing the revolution, 1964-65 (profiles of the first hard line, establishing order while wiping the slate clean); (3) consolidating the regime and divergences, 1966-68 (militarizing the State, social explosions, military opinion, and closing off the regime); (4) the “earthquake,” 1969 (Congress was closed and Institutional Act 5 ushered dictatorship and fear); (5) the heart of the system, 1974-1977 (the “Anos de chumbo” (leaden years), the security community, torture, bombs, and dismissing Frota, and the political opening); (6) the final campaign, 1977-78 (officers, details about the opening, and the return of the first hard line).

Here, we should recall that despite all the talk about preventing a communist revolution there were no large-scale armed threats to Brazilian democracy before the March 31, 1964 coup. It is true that small numbers of members of radical groups were being trained abroad, but these had not yet become operational in Brazil. The so-called revolutionaries asserted that the Goulart government was the threat that had to be toppled to prevent it from turning Brazil into a communist state. Goulart was trying, somewhat ineptly, to reform a society that badly needed it. The fearful Brazilian elites viewed precisely these reforms as
communism on the march. The proposed reforms would have granted the vote to illiterates, injected the State more forcefully into the economy, expropriated lands along federal highways, launched a program of agrarian reform, and, perhaps more unsettling, rowdy public rallies were held to support such reforms. Add to this the Cold War atmosphere, which reached a peak with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, French and American ideas about revolutionary change, and the powder keg was lit. It took the stimulation of harsh repression to produce a truly armed opposition that launched its poorly executed urban attacks and the real but hopeless guerrilla campaign in the Araguaia.

It should not be lost sight of that the pre-coup plotting was a military-civilian affair. The rumors that murderous favelados in Rio would descend from their hillsides to attack the apartment houses of the wealthy spread successfully and defenses were readied. Lira Neto’s Castello: A marcha para a ditadura (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2004) describes Castello Branco’s pre-coup meetings and negotiations with businessmen and politicians. Brazil’s ambiance was dripping with paranoia.

In this book, Chirio has made skillful use of a copious bibliography, research in the files of the defunct Serviço Nacional de Informações, the rich collection of personal archives in CPDOC at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, archives at Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército, the splendid archive of clippings in the offices of the Jornal do Brasil, French records at the Quai d’Orsay, online State Department documents, and conversations with a dozen or so retired Brazilian colonels and generals. This is a well prepared book based on careful research and considerable thought. It was worrisome that the Brazilian Minister of Education recently said that 1964 was not a coup and that the military regime was “a democratic regime by force,” but maybe it is encouraging that he was summarily fired within days. Even so, that he could speak such foolishness underlines the importance of Maud Chirio’s Politics in Uniform.

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The iconic archaeological site of Machu Picchu and tourism to the Cusco region provide clarifying lenses through which to understand the politics of twentieth-century nation-branding in Peru. The story of Hiram Bingham’s 1911 “discovery” of the now-famous Incan citadel, long known to indigenous